Stable Value vs. Money Market: Considerations for Selecting a Prudent Cash Equivalent Option

Stable Value vs. Money Market: Considerations for Selecting a Prudent Cash Equivalent Option

How the two vehicles actually work, what ERISA requires of the committee, and the provider compensation that never shows up as a fee

Nate Moody, CEPA, CPFA  |  Senior Financial Advisor & Partner  |  August 2026

Here’s a question most retirement plan committees have never been asked: what is your plan’s cash option, exactly, and what does it cost?

Not the ticker. The structure. Is it a government money market fund or a prime fund? Is your stable value option a collective trust, an insurance separate account, or a fixed account sitting on your recordkeeper’s balance sheet? What happens if the committee votes to replace it next quarter?

Most committees can’t answer those questions off the top of their heads, and that’s understandable. Capital preservation is usually the smallest allocation on the menu. Nine percent of participants use it, and it holds about 3 percent of plan assets, down from 11 percent in 2016.1

But small doesn’t mean low risk. This is where your least sophisticated participants sit, where your oldest participants sit, and where the contract terms are by far the most complex on the menu. Plaintiffs have sued fiduciaries for offering money market funds, for offering stable value funds, for stable value funds that were too conservative, and for stable value funds that took too much risk. The asset class isn’t the exposure. The absence of a process is.

What ERISA actually requires

Let’s clear up a persistent misconception first. ERISA does not require your plan to offer a capital preservation option at all.

The 404© “broad range of investment alternatives” standard requires at least three diversified alternatives with materially different risk and return characteristics.2 It does not require a money market fund, a stable value fund, or any cash option.

You’ll sometimes hear the phrase “income producing, low risk, liquid fund” cited as proof that a cash option is mandatory. That language is real, but it sits in a different part of the regulation. It’s a condition attached to alternatives that carry restrictions on transfer frequency, not a requirement to populate the menu a certain way.2

Neither vehicle is a long-term qualified default investment alternative, either. A capital preservation product can serve as a QDIA for no more than 120 days after a participant’s first elective contribution, and only in plans with an eligible automatic contribution arrangement. Stable value QDIA relief is grandfathered, and only for assets invested before December 24, 2007.3

So if ERISA doesn’t dictate the answer, what’s the fiduciary question? It isn’t which vehicle is better in the abstract. It’s whether your committee understood the trade-offs, weighed them against your plan’s demographics, design, and likely corporate events, and wrote down why it landed where it did.

The money market question got narrower

If your training materials on money market funds were written before 2024, throw them out. The SEC rewrote Rule 2a‑7 in July 2023, and the market has already reorganized itself around the new rules.4

Three things changed that matter to a plan sponsor. Redemption gates were eliminated entirely, effective October 2023. No money market fund may suspend redemptions anymore. Liquidity fees replaced them: a mandatory fee for institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt funds when daily net redemptions exceed 5 percent of net assets, and a discretionary fee of up to 2 percent that any non-government fund’s board may impose. And the liquidity minimums roughly doubled, to 25 percent daily liquid assets and 50 percent weekly.4

The market’s response was decisive. Institutional prime funds went from 35 funds and $631 billion to 14 funds and $322 billion between June 2023 and October 2024, with roughly $280 billion leaving the category.5 Government funds now hold about 82 percent of a $7.91 trillion industry.6

For a retirement plan, that means the practical choice is a government fund. It holds a stable $1.00 share price, faces no mandatory liquidity fee, and can’t gate redemptions. Retail prime funds are technically available to participant-directed plans, since the beneficial owners are natural persons, but they remain subject to the discretionary fee and most recordkeepers moved on.

What makes a fund a “government” fund

This is a defined term in Rule 2a‑7, not a marketing label. At least 99.5 percent of total assets must be held in cash, government securities, or repurchase agreements that are collateralized fully. Government securities means debt issued or guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States or by a federal agency or instrumentality.7

On top of that, every 2a‑7 fund carries a weighted average maturity cap of 60 days, a weighted average life cap of 120 days, a 397-day limit on any single security, and the 25 and 50 percent liquidity minimums. Government securities are exempt from the issuer diversification limit.8

One caveat worth saying out loud: the $1.00 share price is a convention, not a guarantee. A fund can break the buck.

What to do: Ask your recordkeeper to confirm in writing which Rule 2a‑7 category your plan’s money market option falls into and which share class you hold. Then check whether a lower-cost share class is available at your plan’s asset level. Money market expense ratios averaged 0.24 percent asset-weighted across the industry in 2025, and institutional classes used in plans run well below that.9

How stable value funds actually work

Most committees have a rough sense that stable value is the safe option that pays a little more than cash. That’s true as far as it goes, but it doesn’t help you evaluate one. Here’s the mechanical version, because almost every question a committee should be asking traces back to it.

Two pieces: a bond portfolio and a contract

A stable value fund is a bond portfolio plus a contract. The portfolio produces the return. The contract produces the experience.

The portfolio itself is unremarkable. It’s high-quality, short to intermediate fixed income: Treasuries, agency debt, corporates, and agency mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. Average duration typically runs two to four years and average credit quality is usually in the AA range. Left alone, that portfolio would behave like any short-duration bond fund, with a value that rises and falls as rates move.

The contract is what changes things. A benefit-responsive wrap contract, issued by an insurance company or a bank, obligates the issuer to cover qualified participant withdrawals at book value even when the portfolio is worth less at that moment. Wrap contracts are priced in basis points, and a pooled fund typically spreads that coverage across several issuers rather than relying on one.

How a stable value fund works Time Value Book value Market value Rates rise: bonds fall below book The wrap contract covers the gap for participant withdrawals and the crediting rate amortizes it over the portfolio’s duration Rates fall: surplus builds and lifts the crediting rate Shortfall carried by the wrap (market below book) Surplus (market above book) 1. Bond portfolioHigh-quality short to intermediatebonds. Produces the return. Its marketvalue moves with interest rates.2. Wrap contractInsurer or bank agrees to pay qualifiedparticipant withdrawals at book valueeven when the bonds are worth less.3. Participant statementShows book value: contributions pluscredited interest. Moves in onedirection, at the crediting rate.Illustrative only. Not a depiction of any actual fund. Book value protection depends on contract terms and the claims-paying ability of the wrap issuer.
Figure 1. The bond portfolio’s market value moves with interest rates. The wrap contract lets participants transact at book value, and the crediting rate works the difference off over time.

Book value and market value are two different numbers

Book value is what your participant statement shows: contributions plus credited interest, less withdrawals and fees. It only moves in one direction, at whatever rate the fund is currently crediting.

Market value is what the underlying bonds would fetch if you sold them today. It moves with interest rates, and in a year like 2022 it moves a great deal.

Those two numbers separate whenever rates move, and the ratio between them, market-to-book, is the most useful single number in evaluating a stable value fund. Above 100 percent the portfolio is worth more than participant balances. Below 100 percent it’s worth less, and the wrap is carrying the difference.

The crediting rate is where the two numbers get reconciled

Participants don’t receive the portfolio’s yield. They receive a crediting rate, which is reset periodically and calculated, in simplified form, like this:26

Gross crediting rate = (MV ÷ BV)1/D × (1 + YTM) − 1

MV is market value, BV is book value, D is the portfolio’s duration in years, and YTM is its yield to maturity. Fund expenses come out after that to reach the net rate participants actually see.

The formula looks academic until you put numbers in it.

A hypothetical walk-through

Say a fund holds $100 million of participant balances (book value). Rates rose, so the bonds behind those balances are currently worth $96 million (market value), a market-to-book ratio of 96 percent. The portfolio has a three-year duration and yields 4.50 percent.

Run the math and the gross crediting rate lands at roughly 3.1 percent, not 4.50 percent. The missing 1.4 percentage points is the $4 million shortfall being amortized back over the portfolio’s three-year duration.

Now change one input. If the same portfolio were at a 100 percent ratio, the gross rate would be the full 4.50 percent. That difference is the entire story of why stable value rates lagged after 2022. This illustration is hypothetical, uses assumed inputs, and is not a projection of any fund’s rate or performance.

Four things drive the rate, and they’re worth knowing by name because they’re what you ask about:

  • Portfolio yield. The dominant driver over time. As older bonds mature, proceeds get reinvested at current rates.
  • Market-to-book ratio. Below 100 percent it drags the rate down. Above 100 percent it lifts it.
  • Duration. Longer duration means any gap is amortized more slowly, so the rate moves more gradually in either direction.
  • Cash flow. Inflows at today’s higher rates lift the rate faster when a fund sits below book. Sustained outflows slow the recovery.

Why the rate lags in both directions

Here’s the part committees usually miss. The wrap does not eliminate the gap between book and market value. It defers the gap and amortizes it through the crediting rate over the portfolio’s duration.

That’s the honest answer to the question every committee asked in 2023: why didn’t our stable value rate go up when the Fed raised rates? It couldn’t. The portfolio turns over gradually, and the market value shortfall the rate increase created had to be worked off first. Money market yields, sitting on instruments that mature in weeks, repriced almost immediately.

The same mechanics have historically run the other way when rates fall, with crediting rates typically staying above money market yields for a period after the Federal Reserve cuts. That isn’t a flaw in the product. It’s the smoothing participants are paying the wrap fee to receive.

Four structures, and the differences matter

“Stable value” describes an outcome, not a single product. It comes in four structures, and they are not interchangeable from a fiduciary standpoint.

Structure Who holds the assets What the plan can see
Insurance general account The insurer. The plan is a contract holder and a general creditor. No underlying portfolio to review. No expense ratio. A single issuer carries the entire guarantee.
Insurance separate account A segregated account, insulated from the insurer’s general creditors. Holdings, duration, and credit quality. Fees generally disclosed. Issuer concentration remains.
Pooled collective trust A bank-maintained trust. The plan owns units. Published fact sheet and offering statement, fees by share class, several wrap issuers. Not available to 403(b) plans.
Individually managed account The plan, through a dedicated portfolio built for it. Everything, including guidelines the plan helps set. Requires scale and real oversight capacity.

The row that matters most is the first one, and we’ll come back to it. A general account product is the only structure where there is no portfolio to review and no expense ratio to benchmark.

Where market-to-book stands today

The 2022 rate shock pushed most funds well below book, in many cases into the low 90s. Ratios have recovered as bonds mature and proceeds are reinvested at higher yields. One industry update put the range at roughly 94 to 96 percent as of June 30, 2025, and ratios have generally continued to improve since.10

A ratio below 100 percent isn’t a defect in isolation after a rate shock. A ratio that isn’t recovering while comparable funds recover is a different conversation. Recovery is driven primarily by portfolio roll rather than by market direction, though it isn’t guaranteed, and a further rise in rates can widen the shortfall again.

What the wrap does not do

Three things worth stating plainly, because the word “guarantee” gets used loosely in this category:

  • It is not FDIC insurance and it is not a government guarantee. Stable value funds are not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
  • It depends on the issuer. Book value protection rests on the claims-paying ability and creditworthiness of the wrap providers. Issuer ratings and concentration are legitimate monitoring items.
  • It comes with conditions. Investment guidelines, competing fund restrictions, and employer-initiated event provisions are all contract terms the issuer can enforce, which is the subject of the next section.

The terms that restrict you, not your participants

This is the section I’d read twice if I were on a committee.

Participants are almost always fine. Retirement, death, disability, termination, in-service withdrawals, hardships, and loans are all covered at book value. The restrictions in a stable value contract run against the plan, and they only become visible at the moment the committee wants to act.

Three mechanics govern the exit, and most contracts use more than one:

  • The put period. The plan gives written notice and waits a defined period, most commonly 12 months, before receiving book value. Participant benefit payments continue throughout.
  • The market value adjustment. The plan exits immediately but is paid the lesser of book or market value. When market-to-book sits below 100 percent, that difference is a real and immediate cost. In some contracts the issuer, not the plan, chooses which mechanic applies.
  • The surrender charge. More common in insurance general account and group annuity contracts. Charges of up to 5 percent appear in the reported cases, and a surrender charge can sit on top of a waiting period rather than instead of one.11

Then there’s the risk nobody assigns to anyone. Book value protection covers ordinary participant activity. It generally does not cover events the plan sponsor causes. Layoffs, early retirement windows, plant closings, divestitures, plan mergers, plan termination, recordkeeper conversion, sponsor bankruptcy, and adding a competing investment option can all trigger a market value adjustment or give the issuer a right to terminate.12

Those decisions get made in HR and corporate development, not in the retirement committee. That’s exactly why they get missed.

Finally, competing fund rules. A stable value contract typically restricts transfers toward money market funds, short-duration bond funds, short TIPS funds, and sometimes self-directed brokerage windows, requiring a participant to hold a non-competing option for about 90 days first.13 Practically, that means you generally can’t run stable value and a money market fund side by side without an equity wash, and adding a short-duration option to the menu can breach the covenant.

What to do: Get the contract or offering statement, summarize the exit terms and the event list on one page, and put it in the fiduciary file. Then set a standing notification link so the committee hears about workforce actions, transactions, and recordkeeper changes before they’re executed.

Fixed accounts and the compensation you can’t see

Now for the part that changes how most committees think about this category.

Many recordkeepers, particularly those affiliated with insurance companies, offer their own fixed account or guaranteed interest account as the plan’s capital preservation option. It’s a legitimate product, and the insurer takes real balance sheet risk to provide the guarantee. It’s also a source of provider revenue that never appears as a fee.

The mechanic is simple. Contributions become general assets of the insurer, and the plan is a contract holder rather than the owner of a portfolio. The insurer invests those assets and declares a crediting rate in advance for a set period. The difference between what the portfolio earns and what gets credited is the spread, and it is the insurer’s compensation.

Why doesn’t it show up anywhere? Because the disclosure rules were written that way. The service provider fee rule requires an expense ratio only where the return is not fixed.14 A declared-rate product is a fixed return, so nothing is triggered. The participant disclosure rule matches: a fixed-return option shows a rate and a blank fee column on the comparative chart.15 The stable value industry’s own fee survey records expense ratios for every structure except the general account, where it reports that they are not applicable.

Form 5500 doesn’t close the gap either. Schedule A reports the account balance and commissions paid to intermediaries, not the spread. The Department of Labor has said that insurer expenses netted against the crediting rate are reportable compensation on Schedule C, but the eligible indirect compensation alternative often means no dollar figure ever surfaces.16

What the public record shows

In one case decided after a full trial, the court itemized every deduction an insurer took from its gross expected yield before crediting participants. Two of them existed solely to fund the plan’s recordkeeping: 65 basis points labeled standard expense support and 15 basis points of pricing support. The court described the effect plainly, saying plans received a pass-through credit of 80 basis points for administrative services. Other deductions targeted the insurer’s own return on capital.17

In a second case, a federal appeals court described the spread on a general account product as running between approximately two and three percent, against a disclosed administrative fee of 0.89 percent.18 Both figures describe the specific contracts at issue in those cases and are not representative of the market.

Put that next to what you can see. A government money market fund runs roughly 10 to 25 basis points, disclosed.9 A pooled stable value collective trust runs roughly 14 to 109 basis points all-in including wrap fees, disclosed by share class in the fund’s own annual report.19 The general account shows no number at all.

To be clear about what that does and does not mean: it is not a claim that general account products cost more. It is a statement that the number does not exist in any document your plan receives, which makes it difficult to test whether total compensation is reasonable. And ERISA does require fiduciaries to act for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. Services from a party in interest are prohibited unless no more than reasonable compensation is paid, and the burden of showing reasonableness sits with you.

How to surface it

A provider is generally not obligated to disclose the gross yield on its general account, and declining is lawful. That doesn’t end your duty. It changes the method.

  1. Ask for the decomposition. Request a written breakout of every charge deducted from the gross crediting rate before participants are credited. This maps to how these products are actually priced internally.
  2. Ask what funds recordkeeping. Which portion of the spread pays for recordkeeping, administration, or revenue sharing to this plan, in dollars? Providers often compute this as a discrete internal item already.
  3. Price it from the other side. Ask what your recordkeeping fee would be if the plan moved to a non-proprietary capital preservation option. The difference is a floor estimate of what the spread is funding, and answering it requires no disclosure about the general account at all.
  4. Ask the float questions. The DOL has said float is part of a provider’s compensation and must be disclosed: when it’s earned and retained, the time frames, and the interest rate basis.20 This one applies to every recordkeeper, not only insurers.

If they won’t answer, benchmark the net crediting rate against structurally comparable products, matched on general account structure and reset schedule. After a full trial, one court treated a competitive net rate as a reasonable proxy for the reasonableness of the insurer’s profit.17 Then document that you asked, that the provider declined, and that you performed a comparative analysis in its place.

What the long-term evidence says

Over full interest rate cycles, stable value has produced a higher return than money market funds with a fraction of the volatility. Over shorter windows, particularly when the yield curve is inverted, money market funds can and do lead. Both statements are true, and the table below shows why the period you choose matters so much.

Annualized return through 12/31/2025 Stable value Money market
1 year 3.14% 3.89%
3 years 2.99% 4.51%
5 years 2.60% 2.96%
10 years 2.47% 1.91%
15 years 2.45% 1.28%
15-year standard deviation 0.10% 0.44%

Stable value represented by the SVIA Composite Return Index; money market by the iMoneyNet MFR Money Funds Index.21 Indexes are unmanaged, do not incur expenses, and cannot be invested in directly. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

The one and three year figures reflect the 2022 to 2024 inverted curve, when short rates exceeded intermediate rates. The 10 and 15 year figures span full cycles. Over rolling one-year periods from 2003 through 2025, stable value returns exceeded inflation about 80 percent of the time, compared with about 20 percent for money market funds.21

The same pattern shows up year by year. Using published index data, stable value led cash in seven of the ten calendar years from 2016 through 2025 and in every rolling five-year window through the one ending in 2023. Cash then took the lead in the windows ending 2024 and 2025, once three years of short rates above 4 percent had worked their way into the five-year average.27 Neither result says much about which vehicle a committee should hold. Both say a great deal about the danger of benchmarking on a single window.

Stable value vs. cash: the period you pick decides the winner Stable value (Morningstar US CIT Stable Value Index) Cash (FTSE 3-Month T-Bill Index) A. Calendar-year returns, 2016 to 20250%1%2%3%4%5%6%1.790.2720161.950.8420172.231.8620182.512.2520192.250.5820201.740.0520211.881.5020222.865.2620233.035.4520243.094.402025B. Rolling five-year annualized returns, periods ending 2020 to 20250%1%2%3%4%2.151.162016–20202.141.112017–20212.121.242018–20222.251.912019–20232.352.542020–20242.523.312021–2025Short rates above intermediate ratesSources: Morningstar US CIT Stable Value Index and FTSE 3-Month Treasury Bill Index calendar-year returns as reported in a stable value collective trust fact sheet as of June 30, 2026.Rolling figures computed from calendar-year returns. Indexes are unmanaged, reflect no fees, and cannot be invested in directly. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
Figure 2. Calendar-year and rolling five-year annualized returns, Morningstar US CIT Stable Value Index versus FTSE 3‑Month Treasury Bill Index, 2016 through 2025. The T‑bill index is a gross proxy for cash; an actual money market fund earns somewhat less after expenses.27

The trade-off is worth stating plainly. That additional return comes from taking additional interest rate and credit risk inside a contract that smooths the result. The contract carries a cost, conditions, and issuer credit exposure. It is not a free improvement.

As of mid-August 2026, the federal funds target has held at 3.50 to 3.75 percent since December 2025, the curve is positively sloped again, money market yields have fallen, and stable value crediting rates have risen. The gap that opened in 2022 has largely closed.22 Committees that made a change at the peak of the inversion may have acted at an awkward point in the cycle, which is an argument for evaluating over multiple periods rather than one.

What the courts have told us

Reading the decisions together produces a clear and, honestly, reassuring lesson.

The claim What happened
You should have offered stable value instead of money market Rejected. The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that comparing a money market fund to a higher-returning alternative in hindsight does not plead imprudence.23
The stable value fund was too conservative Dismissed. Deviation from an industry average allocation, standing alone, does not establish imprudence.24
The stable value fund took too much risk Settled for a substantial sum. A fund labeled stable value that held aggressive, illiquid assets drew significant exposure, as did a fund labeled stable value that was managed like cash.
The crediting rate spread was excessive The active theory. Suits filed from 2025 into 2026 target general account and fixed account products. Underperformance alone hasn’t been enough, and one court dismissed a 2026 case on exactly that basis.25

No court has held that a plan must offer stable value, or must offer a money market fund. The greatest exposure has come from a fund whose holdings didn’t match its label, or a contract spread nobody examined. Worth noting: in both of the spread cases that reached a decision, the provider prevailed. Your protection is selection and negotiation at the front end, not litigation afterward.

The Bottom Line

Capital preservation is the smallest line on your menu and the one carrying the most contract complexity. You don’t need to become an expert in wrap contracts. You need a written standard, a quarterly look, and a record of your reasoning. Here’s where to start.

  1. Confirm what you actually hold. Get written confirmation of the vehicle type and structure, and for a money market fund, the Rule 2a‑7 category and share class.
  2. Read the governing document. For stable value or a fixed account that’s the contract or offering statement. For a money market fund it’s the prospectus.
  3. Summarize the terms that constrain you. Competing fund definition, equity wash period, put period, market value adjustment, surrender charges, and the employer-initiated event list. One page, in the fiduciary file.
  4. Request the crediting rate decomposition in writing. Ask which portion funds recordkeeping. Record the request and the answer, including a refusal.
  5. Set a quarterly monitoring set. Net crediting rate, market-to-book ratio, duration, credit quality, and wrap issuer concentration for stable value; net yield, expense ratio, and liquidity levels for money market.
  6. Benchmark over multiple periods against a structurally comparable peer set, and not over a single window that coincides with an unusual rate environment.
  7. Add any provider spread to your total plan cost analysis before concluding that total compensation is reasonable.
  8. Build a notification link with HR and corporate development so you hear about workforce actions, transactions, and recordkeeper changes before they happen.

If your committee hasn’t looked at this category in the last two years, it’s worth an agenda item. We’re glad to read the contract with you, request the decomposition on your behalf, and fold the monitoring metrics into your quarterly reporting. That’s a conversation, not a pitch.

Sources

1 Vanguard, “How America Saves 2026,” June 2026 (2025 plan-year data, more than 1,300 plans and approximately 4.6 million participant accounts).

2 29 CFR 2550.404c‑1(b)(3) and (b)(2)(ii)©.

3 29 CFR 2550.404c‑5(e)(4)(iv) and (v); U.S. Department of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 2008-03, Q18 through Q22.

4 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Money Market Fund Reforms; Form PF Reporting Requirements for Large Liquidity Fund Advisers,” Release No. 33–11211, July 12, 2023; 88 Fed. Reg. 51404, Aug. 3, 2023.

5 Investment Company Institute, Viewpoints analysis of money market fund reform effects, Feb. 5, 2025 (measurement period June 30, 2023 to Oct. 2, 2024).

6 Investment Company Institute, “Money Market Fund Assets,” weekly release, week ended Aug. 5, 2026.

7 17 CFR 270.2a‑7(a); Investment Company Act of 1940, section 2(a)(16).

8 17 CFR 270.2a‑7(d).

9 Investment Company Institute, “Trends in the Expenses and Fees of Funds, 2025,” ICI Research Perspective, March 2026; representative federal money market fund prospectus.

10 Insight Investment and BNY Mellon, stable value industry update, market-to-book data as of June 30, 2025.

11 Rozo v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 4:14-cv-00463 (S.D. Iowa), post-trial findings; Teets v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., No. 18–1019 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2019).

12 ERISA Advisory Council, “Stable Value Funds and Retirement Security in the Current Economic Conditions,” U.S. Department of Labor, 2009; Stable Value Investment Association, Stable Value FAQ.

13 Stable Value Investment Association, “The Evolving Definition of Competing Funds” and Stable Value FAQ.

14 29 CFR 2550.408b‑2©(1)(iv)(E)(2).

15 29 CFR 2550.404a‑5(d)(1).

16 U.S. Department of Labor, 2009 Form 5500 Schedule C frequently asked questions, Q11 and Q22; 2025 Form 5500 Schedule A instructions.

17 Rozo v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 4:14-cv-00463 (S.D. Iowa), findings of fact and conclusions of law following bench trial, aff’d, No. 21–2026 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022).

18 Teets v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., No. 18–1019 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2019).

19 All-in fees including wrap across the thirteen share classes of one large stable value collective trust, annual report as of Dec. 31, 2025.

20 U.S. Department of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 2002–3, Nov. 5, 2002.

21 Franklin Templeton Institutional, “Capital Preservation Matters: Why Stable Value Is Critical in Retirement Plan Menus,” 2026, data as of Dec. 31, 2025.

22 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, open market operations; Crane Data, Crane 100 Money Fund Index, Aug. 12, 2026; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED series T10Y2Y.

23 White v. Chevron Corp., 752 F. App’x 453 (9th Cir. 2018). See also Ortiz v. American Airlines, Inc., 5 F.4th 622 (5th Cir. 2021), decided on Article III standing and involving a credit union deposit option rather than a money market fund.

24 Barchock v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17–1515 (1st Cir. Mar. 23, 2018); Ellis v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., No. 17–1693 (1st Cir. Feb. 21, 2018).

25 Tedford v. Equitable Fin. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:25-cv-02180 (D.N.J. May 21, 2026), motion to dismiss granted without prejudice.

26 Stable Value Investment Association, “Crediting Rate” educational materials; Galliard Capital Management, “Stable Value Crediting Rates: How They Work, How They Are Calculated.” The formula shown is a simplified industry convention; individual contracts vary.

27 Morningstar US CIT Stable Value Index and FTSE 3‑Month Treasury Bill Index calendar-year returns, 2016 through 2025, as reported in T. Rowe Price, Stable Value Common Trust Fund fact sheet, data as of June 30, 2026. Rolling five-year figures are annualized from those calendar-year returns. The Morningstar index tracks pooled stable value collective trusts net of investment management and wrap fees; the T‑bill index reflects no expenses.

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and should not be construed as legal, tax, or investment advice. The information is based on publicly available sources believed to be reliable as of August 2026, but accuracy and completeness are not guaranteed. This article describes categories of investment vehicles generally and does not recommend, endorse, or evaluate any specific fund, manager, insurance company, recordkeeper, or product, and no provider is being accused of any wrongdoing. Comparisons involve products that differ materially in investment objectives, structure, regulation, cost, liquidity, guarantees, availability, and price fluctuation. You could lose money by investing in a money market fund; although certain money market funds seek to preserve the value of your investment at $1.00 per share, they cannot guarantee they will do so, and an investment in a money market fund is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Stable value funds are not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are not insured or guaranteed by the FDIC or any government agency; book value protection depends on the terms of the applicable contract and on the claims-paying ability of the issuing insurance company or bank. The crediting rate walk-through is hypothetical, uses assumed inputs, does not reflect the experience of any actual fund or investor, and is not a projection of any fund’s rate or performance. Index performance is shown for illustrative purposes; indexes are unmanaged, do not incur expenses, and cannot be invested in directly. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results, and no forecast or projection of future performance is intended or should be inferred. Case summaries are provided for educational purposes and do not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with qualified ERISA counsel, tax advisors, or plan consultants before making decisions based on this information. This article does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security or to adopt any particular investment strategy.

Securities offered through Valmark Securities, Inc. Member FINRA/SIPC. Advisory services offered through Valmark Advisers, Inc., a SEC-registered investment advisor. Lebel & Harriman Retirement Advisors is a separately owned entity from Valmark Securities, Inc. and Valmark Advisers, Inc.

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